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Executive Summary 
 
Patent monopolies have long been used as a mechanism for financing innovation and research. The 
logic is that the government awards a monopoly on a product or process for a limited period of time 
in order to reward innovation. However, in addition to providing incentives for innovation and 
research, patent monopolies also provide incentives for a wide-range of rent-seeking behaviors, 
many of which can have major social costs. 
 
This paper attempts to calculate one category of these costs for prescription drugs. It produces 
estimates of the costs associated with mismarketing drugs. The estimates are based on assessments 
of the costs in the form of increased morbidity and mortality associated with five prominent cases of 
mismarketing over the last two decades.  
 
The five drugs examined are Vioxx, Avandia, Bextra, OxyContin, and Zyprexa. In each case, there 
was legal action claiming that the manufacturer had deliberately concealed or misrepresented 
evidence on the safety of the drug. In all five cases, there was either a court ruling against the 
company or a large settlement paid by the company. This is taken as evidence that the company did, 
in fact, deliberately misrepresent research that was available to it. 
 
The cumulative costs associated with the increased morbidity and mortality associated with these 
drugs was $382.4 billion over the 14-year period from 1994–2008. This comes to just over $27 
billion a year, an amount that is comparable to what the pharmaceutical industry claims to have been 
spending on research at the time.  
 
The costs associated with the mismarketing of these five drugs are undoubtedly a small fraction of 
the total costs to society from mismarketing drugs. These drugs were selected because they were 
prominent cases where there was sufficient evidence either to win a legal case or force the payment 
of a substantial settlement. There must be many more cases where companies engaged in similar 
misrepresentations, but where the harm was not as severe and/or it was not possible to gather 
sufficient evidence to support a legal case.  
 
However, the evidence from these five drugs alone suggests that the damage done from marketing 
abuses that result from the perverse incentives created by patent monopolies is quite large relative to 
the amount of research induced by patents. As a result, it is likely that there are more efficient 
alternatives to patent supported drug research, such as publicly financed research. 
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Introduction 
 
The United States spent $373.6 billion on prescription drugs in 20141 which represents 
approximately 12 percent of national health expenditures for that year. Spending on prescription 
drugs has consistently been the fastest growing component of health care spending. The major 
reason for the high cost of drugs is patent protection. By giving pharmaceutical companies a legally 
enforceable monopoly on products that can be essential to life or health, patent protection allows 
them to charge far more than free market price.  
 
It is difficult to assess how much drug costs are inflated due to patent protection. A simple method 
would be to assume that prescriptions filled with brand drugs would instead cost the same on 
average as generic prescriptions. This is plausible since brand drugs as a group are not more 
expensive to manufacture and distribute than generic drugs. According to data from the National 
Association of Chain Drug Stores, in 2010 (the most recent year for which data are available), 71.2 
percent of the prescriptions they filled were for generic drugs with 28.8 percent were for brand 
drugs.2 The average price of a prescription for a brand drug was $166.61 compared with $44.14 for a 
generic prescription. If all drugs were available at the generic price, and assuming the cost and share 
ratios from 2010, it would imply a saving of more than 44 percent or more than $160 billion a year 
based on 2014 drug sales. 
 
However, this figure is likely to hugely understate the potential savings from the elimination of 
patent protection for prescription drugs. Many generic drugs enjoy protected status indirectly 
because of patent protection. The first generic drug in a market gets a period of six months as the 
exclusive generic in order to provide an incentive for generics to enter a market. In addition, brand 
manufacturers now market their own generics during this period. In these cases, the generic would 
still sell for well above the free market price due to limited competition. The threat of patent suits 
may also deter generic manufacturers from entering a market, leaving it less competitive than would 
otherwise be the case. Some of the chemicals used to produce a drug may still be subject to patent 
protection even after the main patents have expired as well. This could also lead to higher prices 
than if all the research associated with developing the drug were in the public domain. 
 
                                                 
1  Bureau of Economic Analysis (2015). 
2  United States Census Bureau (2012). 
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Chain drug stores sell hundreds of generic drugs for less than $10 per prescription.3 As a lower 
bound, we can assume that all brand drugs would sell for $10, somewhat above the price for the vast 
majority of generics at the major chain stores. This would imply savings of over $326 billion 
annually if all drugs were sold without protection in a free market (Table 1).  
 
TABLE 1 
Savings from Ending Patent Monopolies 
(dollars) 
 
Brand Name Drugs Generic Drugs Total Spending Total Savings 
 
28.8 percent of market 71.2 percent of market (billions) (billions) 
Prices, 2010 166.61 44.16 373.6 n.a. 
High patent-free price 44.16 44.16 207.7 165.9 
Low patent-free price 10.00 10.00 47.0 326.6 
Source: United States Census Bureau (2012) 
 
 
The rationale for patent rents is that they provide incentive for innovation. The argument is that 
firms would not undertake large investments in research and development if their innovations could 
be immediately copied by competitors who did not bear this expense. Most immediately, patents 
present a tradeoff between the static inefficiency associated with prices that are above marginal cost, 
compared with the dynamic gains that result from the investment induced by the quest for patent 
rents.4 Furthermore, patents raise issues of dynamic efficiency as well. Patents encourage companies 
to seek out patent rents, often in ways that provide little or no social value. For example, the vast 
majority of drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) are rated as meriting 
standard reviews, meaning that they do not involve qualitative breakthroughs over existing drugs. 
Patent rents encourage drug companies to devote resources to developing drugs that duplicate the 
function of highly-profitable existing drugs.5 It will often be useful to have alternative drugs to treat 
the same condition since not all patients respond the same way. Also, in the context of a system of 
patent monopolies, multiple drugs are likely to lead to somewhat lower prices. Nevertheless, from a 
social standpoint, it is likely that researching conditions for which no effective treatment exists 
would provide a better payoff than finding a new drug to treat a condition for which many options 
are already available.  
 
                                                 
3  For a list of drugs available at Walmart, see http://www.walmart.com/cp/PI-4-Prescriptions/1078664. For a comparable list at 
Costco, see http://www.costco.com/Pharmacy/drug-directory-main?storeId=10301&catalogId=10701&langId=-1.  
4  Boldrin M and Levine DK (2013). 
5  Morgan SG et al. (2005). 
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The resources utilized in maximizing patent rents, such as the sales networks set up by drug 
companies, the lawyers employed to enforce patents and intimidate potential entrants, and the 
lobbyists hired to extend and strengthen patents are all sources of waste associated with the system.6 
However, in the case of prescription drugs, there are also major costs associated with the enormous 
asymmetry between the knowledge available to drug companies and the knowledge available to 
patients and their doctors. As a result of this asymmetry of knowledge, drug companies will often be 
in a situation to earn large patent rents by concealing information that show their drugs are less 
effective than they claimed or possibly even harmful.  
  
One way in which drug companies take advantage of this asymmetry is with “off-label” promotion 
of their drugs. An off-label use of a drug is one which has not been approved by the FDA. While 
doctors are free to prescribe drugs for off-label uses, drug companies are prohibited from promoting 
their drugs for off-label uses. If they want to get a drug approved for additional uses then they have 
to clear a path by seeking FDA approval. However, they routinely avoid this independent 
assessment by finding ways to promote their drugs for unapproved uses.7 Promotion of drugs for 
off-label uses is harmful to the public because it diminishes drug safety regulation, discourages 
companies from conducting or revealing internal safety studies, and incentivizes them to seek FDA 
approval for  narrow “label use” that is easier to push through the approval process.  
 
An analysis by Public Citizen found that between 1991 and 2012, there were 239 major (greater than 
$1 million) criminal and civil settlements reached between state and federal governments and 
pharmaceutical companies with penalties totaling $30 billion dollars for off-label marketing and 
other improper practices.8 Of this amount, 83 percent is due to settlements from 2006 to 2012. 
Even with increasing lawsuits and penalties, it has become evident that drug companies are not 
deterred from engaging in these practices. The profit margins from off-label marketing are 
apparently large enough that fines of this size are inadequate to put an end to the practice.9 
 
Off-label marketing is a subset of practices associated with promoting drugs in contexts where drug 
companies have information that would call in question the safety and/or effectiveness of their 
drugs. In most cases, the harms that are suffered are not due to unavoidable mistakes but rather are 
a direct result of the pursuit of patent rents. The drug Avandia (rosiglitazone), manufactured by 
GlaxoSmithKline provides a clear example of this phenomenon. The drug was approved for treating 
type II diabetes by the FDA in 1999. In 2007, researchers discovered that the multi-billion dollar 
drug was associated with a significant increase in the risk for myocardial infarction and other 
                                                 
6  Federal Trade Commission (2012). 
7  Public Citizen (2010). 
8  Ibid., Public Citizen (2012). 
9  Matthews S (2013). 
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cardiovascular incidents.10 This information was withheld by the company. This misconduct 
ultimately contributed to a $3 billion settlement with the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 2012.11 
 
This is exactly the sort of misbehavior that would be predicted to result from the incentives created 
by the patent system in pharmaceuticals. GlaxoSmithKline stood to make enormous profits from 
concealing the risks of Avandia, and due to the proprietary nature of their research, they were in a 
position to do so. By contrast, if research funding mechanisms had open access requirements, it 
would be far more difficult to conceal evidence that a drug is ineffective or harmful. Data exclusivity 
offers a parallel protectionism that is distinct from patent grants: regulatory bodies are prohibited 
from examining the preclinical and clinical trial safety data of protected drugs when evaluating 
bioequivalent generics.12 The rationale given is that the sponsoring company paid for the trials and 
therefore owns the data. This approach obscures and disregards the public health considerations 
which are supposed to legitimate the enormous benefits and subsidies provided to the industry. 
Indeed, this sort of protectionism has contributed to what Donald Light has termed a “risk-
proliferation syndrome” that has raised prescription drugs to the fourth-leading cause of death in the 
United States.13 
 
Given the frequency of this sort of misconduct by the pharmaceutical industry, it would be useful to 
have some measure of the resulting costs in the form of negative health outcomes such as increased 
morbidity and mortality. The purpose of this paper is to outline a methodology for investigating this 
question and to provide some preliminary calculations of the costs associated with drug companies’ 
misrepresenting or concealing evidence. 
 
 
Methods 
 
Our investigation began by studying Department of Justice press releases, reports from the popular 
media, and the academic literature14 to generate a working list of the major pharmaceutical 
settlements of the last 10 years. From this pool, we then identified those that involved drugs which 
were unlawfully promoted. We further narrowed down this list to identify the drugs with significant 
                                                 
10  Nissen SE and Wolski K (2007). 
11  Wilson (2011). 
12  Adamini S et al. (2009). 
13  Light DW et al (2011). 
14  For example, ProPublica recently published a summary of the largest pharmaceutical settlements of the last few years using DOJ 
data, see http://projects.propublica.org/graphics/bigpharma and ProPublica (2014). 
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risk profiles that were downplayed or disregarded during the marketing process. Once these drugs 
were identified, we performed literature searches using PubMed, Google Scholar, and the New York 
Times website to acquire clinical trial data and mortality/morbidity tallies. Figures and estimates 
expressed by expert clinicians were used when they were reported in the press. In some cases, usage 
and adverse outcome data were not readily available; in these cases, we performed rudimentary 
calculations to generate a ballpark estimate which will be made explicit in the results section.  
 
Cost analysis was performed using monetary estimates discovered in the literature. The Taylor et al. 
group reported a mean lifetime cost of stroke per person in the United States of approximately 
$103,57615 which corresponds to $156,279 in 2014 dollars. We used this figure to estimate the costs 
associated with living with drug-induced heart disease. A landmark study published by Zhuo et al. 
revealed a lifetime diabetes cost of $85,20016 ($86,582 in 2014 dollars); we used this figure to 
estimate the cost of excess cases of drug-induced diabetes. In order to calculate the costs associated 
with premature death, we used an up-to-date “value of life” figure reported by Zenios et al. of 
$129,090 per quality-adjusted year of life17 ($142,447 in 2014 dollars). We used mean treatment ages 
found in the literature and subtracted them from the average lifespan in the U.S. (approximately 79 
years) in order to generate years-of-life-remaining estimates (Table 2). For excess cardiovascular 
events, a case fatality (sudden cardiac death) rate of 44 percent was used to determine the proportion 
resulting in death as described in the results section. 
 
TABLE 2 
Years of  Life Lost Due to Mismarketing of Drugs 
(years) 
Drug Mean Age at Event Life-Years Lost Source 
Vioxx 67 12 Graham DJ et al. (2005) 
Avandia 56 23 Nissen SE and Wolski K. (2007) 
Bextra 62 17 Nussmeier NA et al. (2005) 
OxyContin 50 29 CDC (2010) 
Zyprexa n.a n.a n.a. 
Notes: Ages used to calculate life-years lost in the event of premature death. These values were multiplied by the value 
of quality-adjusted life year, $129,090, to generate costs of premature death. Zyprexa is not represented because no 
premature deaths were computed in this study. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15  Taylor TN (1996). 
16  Zhuo et al. (2013). 
17  Zenios SA et al. (2009). 
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Results 
 
 
Drug Mortality and Morbidity 
1. Vioxx (rofecoxib). In perhaps the most notorious drug withdrawal case, Merck was found 
to have withheld important information regarding the unique cardiovascular risks of this 
COX-2 inhibitor. In 2011, Merck agreed to pay $950 million to resolve criminal and civil 
charges in regards to the improper marketing of Vioxx.18 Dr. David Graham, associate 
director of the FDA’s Office of Drug Safety, in a landmark paper published in The Lancet 
estimated that, between 1999 and 2004, Vioxx resulted in 88,000 to 140,000 excess cases of 
serious heart disease. Furthermore, using case-fatality rate statistics from the American Heart 
Association, Graham et al. estimated that 44 percent of these cases likely resulted in death19: 
approximately 50,000. (See Appendix for calculations.) 
 
2. Avandia (rosiglitazone). Still on the market despite intense controversy, inappropriate 
marketing of this diabetes drug contributed to GlaxoSmithKline’s $3 billion payout to the 
government to resolve civil and criminal charges. The drug was found to have life-
threatening cardiovascular side effects which were intentionally played down by the company 
in order to protect sales. The FDA itself estimated that the drug was responsible for 
approximately 83,000 excess heart attacks between 1999 and 2007.20 Using the case fatality 
rate of 44 percent, approximately 36,520 of these cases resulted in death. 
 
3. Bextra (valdecoxib). This drug contributed to Pfizer’s $2.3 billion settlement for off-label 
promotion in violation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.21 Approved to treat arthritic 
pain in 2001, a Pfizer subsidiary was found guilty of promoting the drug to treat pain 
conditions at dosages the FDA declined to approve; it was removed from the market in 
2005. Used by 7 million patients worldwide,22 CNN reported that by April 2005, more than 
half of Bextra’s $1.7 billion in profits were the result of off-label promoting.23 Using hazard 
ratios found in the literature, we generated a ballpark figure of 47,440 excess cardiovascular 
incidents. With a case fatality rate of 44 percent, approximately 20,870 of these cases resulted 
in death.  
                                                 
18  Department of Justice (2011). 
19  Graham DJ et al. (2005). 
20  Senate Finance Committee (2010). 
21  DOJ (2009a). 
22  Ray WA et al. (2004). 
23  Griffin (2010). 
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4. OxyContin (oxycodone)/opiate analgesics. Since 1999, there has been a 300 percent 
increase in the sale of prescription-strength painkillers (i.e. analgesics) such as OxyContin.24 
In 2008, prescription painkillers were responsible for 14,800 overdose deaths which is more 
than cocaine and heroin combined.25 Purdue Pharmaceuticals was intensely pursued by the 
DOJ and ultimately ordered to pay $600 million in criminal fines for aggressive promotion 
tactics and misbranding the drug as minimally habit-forming.26 The company’s portfolio 
includes other pain medicines including hydrocodone, oxycodone, fentanyl, codeine, and 
hydromorphone. Due to the biomolecular properties of these drugs, dependency on one 
confers addiction to the rest. Though very successful from a commercial perspective, the 
extraordinarily addictive OxyContin has been recognized as a public health disaster: it 
became the leading drug of abuse in the U.S. by 2004.27 Purdue’s aggressive marketing 
campaign heavily contributed to the marked rise in opiate narcotic prescriptions during the 
1990s. Using the market share of OxyContin as a proportion of opioid prescriptions in the 
U.S. generally, we estimate that since its release in 1996 to the criminal proceedings in 2007, 
the drug has been responsible for approximately 29,600 overdose-related fatalities. A study 
published by researchers from the University of Washington and the University of 
Pennsylvania also investigated the economic costs of nonmedical use of prescription 
opioids.28 They found that, in 2006, the costs of OxyContin abuse with regard to abuse 
treatment, medical complications, productivity loss (minus mortality), and criminal justice 
proceedings totaled $5.6 billion. We used this figure to estimate an expanded cost of $38.6 
billion dollars for the time period analyzed i.e. 1996–2007. We attribute this amount to 
“abuse-related costs” (Table 3). 
 
5. Zyprexa (olanzapine). An atypical antipsychotic drug approved for the treatment of 
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, Eli Lilly intentionally played down the drug’s most 
notable side effects such as diabetes and obesity.29 Furthermore, they were aggressive in 
promoting the drug for patient groups not approved by the FDA including children and the 
elderly: categories of people at particularly high risk.30 The New York Times revealed that Eli 
Lilly urged geriatricians to use Zyprexa to sedate elderly patients in nursing homes even 
though the drug increases the risk of sudden death, heart failure, and serious infection in 
                                                 
24  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention  (2011a). 
25  CDC (2011b). 
26  Meier (2007). 
27  Van Zee A (2009). 
28  Hansen RN et al. (2011). 
29  Koro CE et al. (2002). 
30  Harris (2009). 
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elderly patients with dementia.31 In its January 2009 settlement with the DOJ, the company 
agreed to pay $1.4 billion for off-label drug marketing.32 To put this fine in context, it is 
worth noting that sales from Zyprexa in 2007 alone reached $4.8 billion. In a study 
published in the American Journal of Psychiatry,33 researchers at Yale showed that the 
increased risk of developing diabetes attributable to Zyprexa as opposed to a conventional 
antipsychotic in schizophrenia patients is 0.6 percentage points. Using figures from this 
paper, we calculated that Zyprexa caused approximately 42,600 excess cases of diabetes from 
its approval in 1996 to 2008. 
 
 
Associated Costs and Value of Life Analysis 
For Vioxx, the lifetime costs accrued due to excess cases of cardiovascular (CV) disease totaled 
$10.0 billion. The costs for premature death totaled $85.5 billion. For Avandia, the lifetime costs 
accrued due to excess cases of CV disease totaled $7.3 billion. The costs for premature death totaled 
$119.6 billion. For Bextra, the lifetime costs accrued due to excess cases of CV disease totaled $4.2 
billion. The costs for premature death totaled $50.5 billion. For OxyContin, the costs for premature 
death totaled $63.0 billion and abuse-related costs totaled $38.6 billion.34 For Zyprexa, the lifetime 
costs accrued due to excess cases of diabetes totaled $3.7 billion. The sum total costs for all five 
drugs combined is $382.4 billion (Table 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31  Ibid. 
32  DOJ (2009b). 
33  Leslie DL and Rosenheck RA (2004). 
34  For the calculation of abuse-related costs, see Appendix. 
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TABLE 3 
Morbidity/Mortality Statistics Associated with Five Unlawfully Promoted Drugs and their Associated Costs 
Drug Associated Morbidity/Mortality Time Period 
Calculated Cost 
(2014 dollars, 
billions) 
Vioxx (Merck) 64,000 excess cardiovascular events, 50,000 deaths 1994–2004 95.5 
Avandia (GSK) 46,480 excess cardiovascular events, 36,520 deaths 1994–2007 126.9 
Bextra (Pfizer) 26,570 excess cardiovascular events, 20,870 deaths 2001–2005 54.7 
OxyContin (Purdue) 15,260 overdose related fatalities, and abuse-related costs 1996–2007 101.6 
Zyprexa (Eli Lilly) 42,600 excess cases of diabetes 1996–2008 3.7 
  Total Costs 382.4 
Notes: The excess CV events represented in this table are cases without sudden cardiac death, i.e. the number of deaths 
was subtracted out from the total CV events described above. All monetary values are in 2014 dollars. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
There are clearly serious limitations to this study. In many cases, public information was unavailable; 
as indicated, we substituted computational assumptions. For example, cohort data pulled from 
retrospective analyses found in the literature were combined with worldwide drug usage figures 
found in the popular press. The ratios of domestic to international sales were used to generate 
estimates for domestic drug usage. Such methods undoubtedly lead to imprecise measurements. 
However, it is reasonable to conclude that our estimates are at least in the right order of magnitude. 
The non-overlapping time periods analyzed represent another significant caveat of this study. The 
start points are drug release dates but the end points were arbitrarily limited by the data that was 
available to us. Though some end points (e.g. for Vioxx) represent the year of withdrawal for the 
market, some drugs (e.g. Zyprexa) are still available. As such, this problem would be corrected by 
improved access to usage information.  
 
It is important for our “value-of-life” analysis to be properly understood. The emergence of costly 
medical technologies has made necessary the calculation of the financial value of one year of life to 
properly carry out cost-benefit analyses. This question also arises in lawsuits seeking damages. For 
research and development purposes, the question that needs to be answered in order to determine 
whether or not expensive medical interventions should be pursued is, “How much are we, as a 
society, willing to pay to improve health outcomes?”35 For this study, we used an estimate published 
                                                 
35  Stanford Graduate School of Business (2008). 
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recently by researchers at Stanford:36 $129,000 for one quality-adjusted year of life (QALY) in 2009 
dollars translated to $142,447 for one QALY in 2014 dollars. This amount was multiplied by years 
of life lost (Table 2) to generate the cost associated with premature death due to drug intervention. 
 
Ultimately, our investigations revealed a $382.4 billion toll imposed by the inappropriate marketing 
of five drugs. We chose five drugs for the sake of simplicity and because the information available to 
us limited the number of cases that facilitated meaningful calculation. For example, if we were 
unable to find or generate an estimate for how many patients were prescribed a specific drug in the 
United States, then we excluded that case from our analysis. Given that there have been many 
prominent cases of drug mismarketing in recent years, the calculations in this study would be 
improved with of the inclusion of a larger number of examples of mismarketing. Table 4 outlines an 
additional seven prominent examples of pharmaceutical marketing violations which would merit the 
methodologies described and employed in this study. An expanded study would require the 
corresponding morbidity and usage statistics that we found for the five drugs we used.  
 
TABLE 4 
Potential Off-label Promotion Violators for Future Investigation 
Drug 
Settlement amount 
(millions of dollars) 
Year Company Source 
Risperdal 2200 2013 J&J DOJ (2013) 
Depakote 1500 2012 Abbott Labs DOJ (2012a) 
Aranesp 762 2012 Amgen DOJ (2012b) 
Serostim 704 2005 Serono DOJ (2005) 
Seroquel 520 2010 AstraZeneca DOJ (2010) 
Abilify 515 2007 Bristol-Myers DOJ (2007) 
Neurontin 430 2004 Pfizer DOJ (2004) 
 
The $382.4 billion figure can probably best be taken as providing an order of magnitude of the costs 
associated with the concealing and misrepresentation of research findings. Since these costs were 
calculated over a 14-year period it implies annual costs of about $27 billion a year. While these drugs 
were selected because they were prominent examples of especially harmful incidents of 
misrepresentation, the total costs from misrepresentation and concealment would almost certainly 
be at least two or three times as large as the amount attributable to this small group of drugs. 
 
It is also important to remember that the bulk of these costs are associated with deliberate acts of 
concealment and misrepresentation, not honest mistakes. Mistakes and oversights will invariably 
occur in medical research. However, in the cases cited here the companies were charged with 
                                                 
36  Ibid. See also Zenios SA (2009). 
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deliberately concealing or misrepresenting evidence for the purpose of increasing sales of their 
drugs. This is behavior that is directly associated with patent rents. If, for example, this research was 
all in the public domain and carried through by researchers who had no direct financial interest in 
the sales of a drug, it is unlikely that they would go to elaborate lengths to misrepresent or conceal 
research findings, or that they would be successful if they tried. In other words, the costs 
documented here are the result of the incentives provided by patent monopolies in the same way 
that the research itself is motivated by patent monopolies.  
 
A useful reference point for this calculation of losses is the amount of money that the 
pharmaceutical industry was spending on research at the time. Over the period from 1994 to 2008, 
the industry’s spending on research averaged less than $25 billion a year.37 This means that the   
estimated damages due to inappropriate marketing of just these five drugs are comparable to what 
the entire industry was spending on research. While there is a large amount of uncertainty around 
these calculations, it is certainly plausible that a full measure of the costs associated with 
mismarketed drugs would equal or exceed the patent supported research over this period, and quite 
possibly by a large amount. This would be a strong argument for seeking more efficient alternatives 
to patent-supported research. 
 
This is an issue that deserves an important place on the United States and world policy agenda, 
particularly in the context of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and 
Investment Pact.38 One of the major goals of the United States in these and other trade pacts 
currently being negotiated is to strengthen patent and related protections for prescription drugs. The 
justification is that increased patent rents will provide a greater incentive to the pharmaceutical 
industry, leading to more innovation. This drive for greater protections is being resisted by many 
other countries. India, in particular, has been opposed to tightening patent protections, seeking to 
advance its generic drug industry. 
 
The fact that incentives from patent rents lead firms to promote drugs in ways that impose large 
costs on patients and society should raise additional questions about the desirability of patent 
protection as a mechanism for financing research. Other mechanisms for financing research have 
been proposed, such as a prize system or direct public funding.39 Of course the U.S. government 
already spends $30.9 billion annually funding biomedical research40 through grants administered by 
                                                 
37  This figure is taken from Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (2014). For the data for years prior to 2004, 
see Van Oster P. (2011), “Drug Discovery and Human Development: Human Cytome Project,” 
[http://www.vanosta.be/hcpphrm.htm]. These numbers would have to be adjusted upward to be put in 2014 dollars.  
38  The New York Times Editorial Board (2013). 
39  See Stiglitz (2006) and Baker (2004). 
40  National Institutes of Health (2015). 
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the National Institutes of Health, so direct public funding is already an integral part of the drug 
development process. The proposal is to expand this funding and have NIH’s mission extend to the 
development and testing of drugs. By having all research in the public domain and taking away the 
patent rents associated with marketed drugs, direct funding would both remove the incentive and 
hugely lessen the ability to misrepresent research in order to promote drugs for uses that may not be 
appropriate. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
All drugs carry side effects which inevitably increase morbidity and mortality risks. To minimize 
these risks drug manufacturers need to provide all available safety data for a given drug and respect 
the law when marketing drugs. What we find, however, is that patent protectionism enables and 
encourages manufacturers to conceal adverse safety data that might harm sales and to seek approval 
for the narrowest indications for use, especially when they can promote the drug for off-label uses 
post-approval. Research carried out by Kesselheim and Avorn at Harvard shows that routine 
regulatory oversight as currently practiced fails to fully uncover important hazard statistics associated 
with widely marketed drug products including Vioxx, Bextra, and Zyprexa.41 For every drug case 
they examined, however, they concluded that “the litigation process revealed new data on the 
incidence of adverse events, enabled reassessments of drug risks through better evaluation of data, 
and influenced corporate and regulatory behavior…In performing these tasks, lawyers and their 
clients often find themselves serving as drug safety researchers of last resort.” Safety data should not 
have to come to light ex post facto: that is, after the harm to patients has been done. Furthermore, 
even though litigation has a positive influence on corporate behavior, it is clearly not enough. It is 
still extremely profitable to illegally market a drug.  
 
Off-label promotion and the concealment of adverse drug safety data are predictable outcomes of 
government-issued patents to the pharmaceutical industry. In addition to the other inefficiencies 
associated with patent-driven innovation, they impose a significant burden to sick patients and the 
economy. In a case examination of five unlawfully promoted drugs, we have shown the financial 
burden to be approximately $382.4 billion or more than $27 billion a year for the period examined. 
Given that that there are several more similar cases not studied here, this estimate is just a fraction 
of the total cost imposed by the perverse incentives of patent protectionism. Furthermore, financial 
                                                 
41  Kesselheim A.S. and Avorn J. (2007). 
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characterization understates the human suffering caused by drugs that perhaps should never have 
been available to the public at all. With health spending skyrocketing in the United States—indeed, 
across the globe—more efficient alternatives to drug development merit serious consideration. 
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Appendix 
 
The cost calculations for Vioxx began with the “88,000 to 140,000 excess cases of serious heart 
disease” figure calculated by Dr. David Graham and using the average of these two extremes: 
114,000. The case fatality rate employed by Graham in estimating the number of deaths that likely 
resulted from these excess cases of heart disease was 44 percent. Hence, approximately 50,000 
excess deaths and 64,000 excess cases of heart disease. The former figure was multiplied by the value 
of life reported by Zenios et al. (2009) and by the calculated life years lost (Table 2) in order to 
generate the cost associated with premature death. The latter figure was multiplied by the lifetime 
costs associated with stroke reported by Taylor et al. in order to generate the cost associated with 
unnecessary disease. Analogous calculations were made for the remaining drugs with appropriate 
modifications. The case fatality rate of 44 percent was used for Bextra and Avandia due to stroke 
being included in their list of adverse events, which are already cardiovascular in nature. For 
example, an important study conducted by Graham et al. in 2010 concluded that prescription of 
rosiglitazone was associated with an increased risk of stroke, heart failure, and all-cause mortality.42 
 
There were no pre-existing morbidity and mortality statistics reported for Bextra; thus, we carried 
out our own estimations. We started with the usage figure of 7 million patients worldwide reported 
in Ray WA (2004) and examined Pfizer’s 2005 earning statement to ascertain the domestic versus 
international distribution of sales revenue.43 We used this ratio as a general indicator of domestic 
usage as a proportion of worldwide usage, i.e. 7 million patients. In the first nine months of 2005, 
Bextra posted earnings of $869 million worldwide and $771 million in the U.S. alone (thus, $98 
million internationally). Using the assumption that the U.S. spends twice as much per drug on 
average than the rest of the world44, we corrected this ratio by dividing the domestic proportion in 
half:  
 
771
2
 ÷  [
771
2
+ 98]  = 79.7% 
 
According to CNN, by April 2005, more than half of Bextra’s $1.7 billion in profits came from off-
label prescriptions.45 We then assumed that, of the 7 million patients prescribed Bextra worldwide, 
                                                 
42  Graham DJ et al. (2010). 
43  Pfizer Inc. (2005). 
44  Lutz (2012). 
45  See  Griffin (2010). 
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3.5 billion patients were prescribed for post-operative pain, the main unapproved usage it was 
promoted for. Several reports have agreed that there is an approximately 3-fold higher risk of 
cardiovascular events with Bextra over placebo.46 For our calculations, we used an event rate of 2.6 
percent in Bextra patients versus 0.9 percent in placebo patients: figures drawn from the literature.47  
  
3.5 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 ×  0.26 = 91,000 
3.5 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 ×  .009 = 31,500 
91,000 − 31,500 = 59,500 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑉 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
 
Of 59,500 excess cardiovascular events due to Bextra, 79.7 percent were presumably in the United 
States: 47,440 events. Using the 44 percent fatality rate, approximately 20,870 died. 
 
For OxyContin, we started with the CDC estimate that opioid pain relievers were responsible for 
14,800 deaths out of 20,444 prescription drug overdose deaths in 2008. Furthermore, Oxycodone-
derived products accounted for 15 percent of the market.48 Thus, we calculated roughly 2.220 
overdose deaths due to OxyContin in 2008. Given that prescribing of this compound increased 300 
percent from 1999, we used a corrected mean figure of 1387.5 per year.49 Notably, this figure agrees 
well with other estimates found in the literature.50 Multiplying by the 11 years from its release in 
1996 to the settlement in 2007, we computed a mortality figure of approximately 15,260 deaths from 
overdose. From the Hansen et al. paper, we found abuse related costs associated with OxyContin 
(subtracting costs due to mortality) to be $5.6 billion in 2006 alone. This included elements such as 
treatment for abuse of the drug, medical complications, productivity loss, and criminal justice. Given 
that prescribing increased 300 percent from 1999, we corrected this figure to a mean of $3.5 billion 
per year. Multiplying by 11 years (i.e. from 1996–2007), this yields $38.6 billion. 
 
When researching Zyprexa, we discovered in the mainstream press that 23 million people worldwide 
were taking the drug in 2008.51 In a release to investors, Eli Lilly reported that, in the first quarter of 
2008, Zyprexa sales totaled $1.1 billion: $500 million domestically and $600 million internationally.52 
As in the case of Bextra, we assumed that the U.S. spends twice as much on drugs as the rest of the 
world. Furthermore, we used the domestic vs. international sales distribution to estimate the number 
of patients taking Zyprexa in the U.S. We calculated that U.S. prescriptions accounted for 29.4 
                                                 
46  Furberg et al. (2005). 
47  Aldington S et al. (2005). 
48  Walsh et al. (2008). 
49  See CDC (2011a-b). 
50  See Hansen RN (2011). 
51  Brenson (2008). 
52  `Eli Lilly (2008). 
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percent of the total; 23 million x 0.294 = 6.8 million U.S. patients.53 The American Journal of 
Psychiatry paper referenced in the results section stated an attributable diabetes risk of 0.6 percent.54 
Thus, we estimated 42,600 excess cases of diabetes due to Zyprexa. 
 
  
                                                 
53  Notably, our calculation fits the scale of a similar figure reported in the mainstream media, see 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/06/business/06zyprexa.html. 
54  See  Leslie DL (2004). 
 Patent Monopolies and the Costs of Mismarketing Drugs 18 
 
References 
 
Adamini S, Maarse H, Versluis E, Light DW. 2009. “Policy making on data exclusivity in the 
European Union: from industrial interests to legal realities.” J Health Polit Policy Law, Vol. 34, 
No. 6, pp. 979–1010. 
 
Aldington S, Shirtcliffe P, Weatherall M, Beasley R. 2005. “Increased risk of cardiovascular events 
with parecoxib/valdecoxib: a systematic review and meta-analysis.” N Z Med J, Vol. 118 No. 
1226, p. U1755. 
 
Baker, D. 2004. “Financing Drug Research: What Are the Issues?” Washington, DC: Center for 
Economic and Policy Research.   
http://www.cepr.net/index.php/publications/reports/financing-drug-research-what-are-
the-issues/. 
 
Boldrin M, Levine DK. 2013. “The case against patents.” Journal of Economic Policy Perspectives, Vol. 27, 
No. 1, pp. 3–22. 
 
Brenson A. 2008. “Lilly Settles Alaska Suit Over Zyprexa.” The New York Times, March 26.  
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/26/business/26cnd-zyprexa.html. 
 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 2015. “National Income and Product Accounts.” Washington, 
DC: BEA. Table 2.4.5U, Line 121. 
 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). 2011a. “Policy Impact: Prescription Painkiller 
Overdoses.” Atlanta, Georgia: CDC.  
http://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pubs/index.html#tabs-760094-4. 
 
____. 2011b. “Overdoses of Prescription Opioid Pain Relievers—United States, 1999–2008.” 
Atlanta, Georgia: CDC.  
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6043a4.htm. 
 
____. 2010. “Unintentional Drug Poisoning in the United States.” Atlanta, GA: CDC.  
http://www.cdc.gov/homeandrecreationalsafety/pdf/poison-issue-brief.pdf. 
 
Department of Justice (DOJ). 2013. “Johnson & Johnson to Pay More Than $2.2 Billion to Resolve 
Criminal and Civil Investigations.” Washington, DC: DOJ.  
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/johnson-johnson-pay-more-22-billion-resolve-criminal-
and-civil-investigations. 
 
____. 2012a. “Abbott Labs to Pay $1.5 Billion to Resolve Criminal & Civil Investigations of Off-
label Promotion of Depakote.” Washington, DC: DOJ.  
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/abbott-labs-pay-15-billion-resolve-criminal-civil-
investigations-label-promotion-depakote. 
 
 Patent Monopolies and the Costs of Mismarketing Drugs 19 
 
____. 2012b. “Amgen Inc. Pleads Guilty to Federal Charge in Brooklyn, NY.; Pays $762 Million to 
Resolve Criminal Liability and False Claims Act Allegations.” Washington, DC: DOJ.  
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/amgen-inc-pleads-guilty-federal-charge-brooklyn-ny-pays-
762-million-resolve-criminal. 
 
____. 2011. “U.S. Pharmaceutical Company Merck Sharp & Dohme to Pay Nearly One Billion 
Dollars Over Promotion of Vioxx.” Washington, DC: DOJ.  
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/November/11-civ-1524.html.  
 
____. 2010. “Pharmaceutical Giant AstraZeneca to Pay $520 Million for Off-label Drug Marketing.” 
Washington, DC: DOJ.  
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/pharmaceutical-giant-astrazeneca-pay-520-million-label-
drug-marketing. 
 
____. 2009a. “Justice Department Announces Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement in Its History.” 
Washington, DC: DOJ.  
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/September/09-civ-900.html. 
 
____. 2009b. “Eli Lilly and Company Agrees to Pay $1.415 Billion to Resolve Allegations of Off-
label Promotion of Zyprexa.” Washington, DC: DOJ.  
http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/News/2009/jan/lillyrelease.pdf. 
 
____. 2007. “Bristol-Myers Squibb to Pay More Than $515 Million to Resolve Allegations of Illegal 
Drug Marketing and Pricing.” Washington, DC: DOJ.  
http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007/September/07_civ_782.html. 
 
____. 2005. “SERONO TO PAY $704 MILLION FOR THE ILLEGAL MARKETING OF 
AIDS DRUG.” Washington, DC: DOJ.  
http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2005/October/05_civ_545.html. 
 
____. 2004. “WARNER-LAMBERT TO PAY $430 MILLION TO RESOLVE CRIMINAL & 
CIVIL HEALTH CARE LIABILITY RELATING TO OFF-LABEL PROMOTION.” 
Washington, DC: DOJ.  
http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2004/May/04_civ_322.htm. 
 
Eli Lilly and Company. 2008. “Eli Lilly First Quarter of 2008 Sales.” Indianapolis, IN: Eli Lilly and 
Company. https://investor.lilly.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=305589. 
 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 2012. “Agreements Filed With the Federal Trade Commission 
Under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003.” 
Washington, DC: FTC. http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130117mmareport.pdf. 
 
Furberg CD, Psaty BM, Fitzgerald GA. 2005. “Parecoxib, valdecoxib, and cardiovascular risk.” 
Circulation, Vol. 111, No. 3, p. 249. 
 
Graham DJ et al. 2010. “Risk of acute myocardial infarction, stroke, heart failure, and death in 
elderly Medicare patients treated with rosiglitazone or pioglitazone.” JAMA, Vol. 304, No. 4, 
pp. 411–8. 
 Patent Monopolies and the Costs of Mismarketing Drugs 20 
 
 
Graham DJ et al. 2005. “Risk of acute myocardial infarction and sudden cardiac death in patients 
treated with COX-2 selective and non-selective NSAIDs: nested case-control study.” Lancet, 
Vol. 365, pp. 475–81. 
 
Griffin D. 2010. “Feds found Pfizer too big to nail.” CNN. April 2.  
 http://www.cnn.com/2010/HEALTH/04/02/pfizer.bextra/index.html. 
 
Hansen RN, Oster G, Edelsberg J, Woody GE, Sullivan SD. 2011. “Economic costs of nonmedical 
use of prescription opioids.” Clin J Pain, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 194–202. 
 
Harris G. 2009. “Settlement Called Near On Zyprexa.” The New York Times. January 15. 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C02E4DC103BF936A25752C0A96F9C8
B63. 
 
Kesselheim AS, Avorn J. 2007. “The role of litigation in defining drug risks.” JAMA, Vol. 297, No. 
3, pp. 308–311. 
 
Koro CE et al. 2002. “Assessment of independent effect of olanzapine and risperidone on risk of 
diabetes among patients with schizophrenia: population based nested case-control study.” 
BMJ, Vol. 325, p. 243. 
 
Leslie DL, Rosenheck RA. 2004. “Incidence of newly diagnosed diabetes attributable to atypical 
antipsychotic medications.” Am J Psychiatry, Vol. 161, pp. 1709–1711. 
 
Light DW, Lexchin J, Schaaber J. 2011. “Longer exclusivity does not guarantee better drugs.” Health 
Aff (Millwood), Vol. 30, No. 4, p. 798. 
 
Lutz A. 2012. “See How Much More Americans Pay For Prescription Drugs.” Business Insider, 
August 29.  
http://www.businessinsider.com/see-how-much-more-americans-pay-for-prescription-
drugs-2012-8. 
 
Matthews S. 2013. “Pharma fines increase, but the pain is not felt on Wall Street.” Nature Medicine, 
Vol. 19, No. 5. 
 
Meier B. 2007. “In Guilty Plea, OxyContin Maker to Pay $600 Million.” The New York Times. May 
10. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/business/11drug-web.html. 
 
Morgan SG, Bassett KL, Wright JM, et al. 2005. “‘Breakthrough’ drugs and growth in expenditure 
on prescription drugs in Canada.” BMJ, Vol. 331, No.7520, pp. 815–6. 
 
National Institutes of Health (NIH). 2015. “NIH Budget.” Bethesda, Maryland: NIH. 
http://www.nih.gov/about/budget.htm. 
 
Nissen SE, Wolski K. 2007. “Effect of rosiglitazone on the risk of myocardial infarction and death 
from cardiovascular disease.” NEJM, Vol. 356, No. 24, pp. 2457–71. 
 
 Patent Monopolies and the Costs of Mismarketing Drugs 21 
 
Nussmeier NA et al. 2005. “Complications of the COX-2 inhibitors parecoxib and valdecoxib after 
cardiac surgery.” NEJM, Vol. 352, pp. 1081–91. 
 
Pfizer Inc. 2005. “Third-Quarter 2005 Performance Report.” New York City, NY: Pfizer Inc. 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/78003/000127528705003956/pi3794ex991.txt. 
 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America. 2014. “2014 Biopharmaceutical Research 
Industry Profile.” Washington, DC: PhRMA.  
 http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2014_PhRMA_PROFILE.pdf. 
 
ProPublica. 2014. “Big Pharma’s Big Fines.” New York, NY: ProPublica. 
http://projects.propublica.org/graphics/bigpharma. 
 
Public Citizen. 2012. “Pharmaceutical industry criminal and civil penalties: an update.” Washington, 
DC: Public Citizen. http://www.citizen.org/documents/2073.pdf. 
 
____. 2010. “Rapidly Increasing Criminal and Civil Monetary Penalties Against the Pharmaceutical 
Industry: 1991 to 2010.” Washington, DC: Public Citizen. http://www.citizen.org/hrg1924. 
 
Ray WA et al. 2004. “Cardiovascular toxicity of valdecoxib.” NEJM, Vol. 351, p. 2767. 
 
Senate Finance Committee. 2010. “Grassley, Baucus Release Committee Report on Avandia.” 
Washington, DC: Senate Finance Committee.  
http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/release/?id=bc56b552-efc5-4706-
968d-f7032d5cd2e4. 
 
Stanford Graduate School of Business. 2008. “How much will we pay for a year or life?” Stanford, 
CA: Stanford Graduate School of Business.  
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/research/zenios_valueoflife.html. 
 
Stiglitz J. 2006. “Give prizes not patents.” The New Scientist, September 16.  
https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/download/2006_New_Scientist.pdf. 
 
Taylor TN et al. 1996. “Lifetime cost of stroke in the United States.” Stroke, Vol. 27, pp. 1459–1466. 
 
The New York Times Editorial Board. 2013. “A Pacific Trade Deal.” The New York Times. 
November 5. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/06/opinion/a-pacific-trade-deal.html. 
 
United States Census Bureau (USCB). 2012. “U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United 
States: 2012.” Suitland, Maryland: USCB.  
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0159.pdf. 
 
Van Oster P. 2011. “Drug Discovery and Human Development: Human Cytome Project.” 
http://www.vanosta.be/hcpphrm.htm. 
 
Van Zee A. 2009. “The promotion and marketing of oxycontin: commercial triumph, public health 
tragedy.” The American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 99, No. 2, pp. 221.  
 
 Patent Monopolies and the Costs of Mismarketing Drugs 22 
 
Walsh SL, Nuzzo PA, Lofwall MR, Holtman JR. 2008. “The relative abuse liability of oral 
oxycodone, hydrocodone and hydromorphone assessed in prescription opioid abusers.” 
Drug Alcohol Depend., Vol. 98, No. 3, pp. 191–202. 
 
Wilson D. 2011. “Glaxo Settles Cases With U.S. for $3 Billion.” The New York Times, November 3. 
 
Zenios SA et al. 2009. “An empiric estimate of the value of life: updating the renal dialysis cost-
effectiveness standard.” Value In Health, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 80–87. 
 
Zhuo X et al. 2013. “Lifetime direct medical costs of treating type 2 diabetes and diabetic 
complications.” Am J Prev Med, Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 253–261.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
